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Abstract
We develop a model where the coexistence of money and a higher yielding asset is en-
dogenously obtained when no restriction is placed on the use of either object as a medium of
exchange. Due to the presence of uninsurable risks, agents have, in equilibrium, di¤erent relative
valuations of the asset to money, and hence, the use of money as a means of payment is strictly
preferred. This endogenous di¤erence in the willingness of agents to use money over the asset
implies that money carries a greater liquidity premium than the asset. We obtain that the asset
strictly dominates money in terms of the expected rate of return, except at the Friedman rule.
Since buyers are risk neutral with respect to the dividend payment of the asset, they hold both
the asset and money despite the rate of return dominance of asset to money. We obtain that for
low levels of ination the price of the asset, and therefore its real rate of return, is not a¤ected
by the rate of ination. This is because the asset is not used as a means of payment, only
money is, and the price of the asset is given by its fundamental value. But when the ination
rate becomes large enough, real balances are so low that buyers will then start using the asset
as a means of payment in addition to money, and here, the asset will carry a liquidity premium
as well, although it is smaller than that of money. The price of the asset is then increasing in
the ination rate, and its real rate of return is therefore negatively correlated with the ination
rate.
We thank Guillaume Rocheteau and Randy Wright for their insightful comments. Contacts:
njacquet@smu.edu.sg; serenetan@nus.edu.sg.
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1 Introduction
This article is a theoretical study of the impact of monetary policy and ination on asset prices.
There has been a number of such studies, e.g., Danthine and Donaldson (1986), Lucas (1980, 1982,
1984), Svensson (1985), Townsend (1987), Marshall (1992) and Bansal and Coleman (1996), but all
these studies consider consumption based asset pricing models à la Lucas (1978), in which money
is introduced either by putting money in the utility function (MIU), or through a cash-in-advance
(CIA) or CIA-like constraint, or a transaction cost function (TC). Others (e.g. Freeman, 1985)
have used overlapping-generations (OG) models. Although OG models are deep models of money
because they capture the store-of-value property of money, they do not really capture its transaction
role, which is the feature that distinctively di¤erentiates money from other assets. However, these
models do not explain why money is used as a means of payment rather than other, potentially
higher yielding, assets. Hence, when these models study the impact of ination in asset prices,
because they do not allow agents to substitute away from money as a means of payment, they are
potentially missing an important ingredient in how assets are priced.
On the other hand, the deep models of money that are search-theoretic monetary models were,
until recently, ill-equipped to study asset prices. In fact, in models of the tradition of Kiyotaki and
Wright (1991, 1993), Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995), all trades are decentralized, and
it is therefore di¢ cult to price assets. In a recent paper, Lagos and Wright (2005), LW hereafter,
have developed a search-theoretic model of money that blends centralized and decentralized trade,
opening the door for a great number of application that previous search-theoretic models of money
could not handled, among them asset pricing.
However, when di¤erent assets can be used as means of payment, it is not clear why at
money, which is usually return dominated, would circulate. In Lagos and Rocheteau (2007) and
Geromichalos et al. (2007) money competes against neoclassical capital and Lucas trees respectively
as a means of exchange, and they obtain that as long as the e¢ cient stock of capital or the stock
of Lucas trees is large enough to carry out transactions in the decentralized market, a monetary
equilibrium exists only at the Friedman rule, in which case it is not essential. Others papers
like Aruoba et al. (2007b), Berentsen et al., (2008) or Telyukova and Wright (2008) assume that
counterfeiting claims to asset or productive capital or IOUs is costless, whereas money cannot be
counterfeited, so money circulates as a means of payment even if it is return dominated. Lagos
(2007) considers, in a version of his asset pricing model based on LW, a model with an exogenous
proportion of trades where stocks can be used, whereas bonds (or money) can always be used as a
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means of payment.1 Lester et al. (2008) consider a model where a fraction of agents can recognize
counterfeits, but those who cannot recognize them accept only money as a means of payment.
These papers obtain the coexistence of money and higher yielding assets because assets cannot be
used in some types of meetings whereas money can be used in all types of meetings. That is, money
is more liquid, and therefore money carries a higher liquidity premium. In these papers, agents are
homogeneous, but there is an exogenous di¤erence in the liquidity properties of money and other
assets due to a di¤erence in agentsability to use money compared to these other assets.
In this paper we develop a model where the coexistence of money and a higher yielding asset
is endogenously obtained where no restriction is placed on the use of either object as a medium
of exchange. In our paper, due to the presence of uninsurable risks, in equilibrium, agents have
di¤erent relative valuations of the asset to money, and hence, the use of money as a means of
payment is strictly preferred. This endogenous di¤erence in the willingness of agents to use money
over the asset implies that money carries a greater liquidity premium than the asset.
More specically, we consider a OG variation of the LW model, with alternating centralized
markets (CM) and decentralized markets (DM), where agents of each generation live for three
subperiods.2 Agents can be either buyers and sellers: buyers want to consume in the DM and have
a constant disutility of e¤ort in the last CM of their lives, whereas sellers can only produce in the
DM and face an uninsurable risk3 in the last CM of their lives because their disutility of e¤ort is
stochastic and negatively correlated with the dividend payment of the asset. This is what creates a
wedge between the valuations of the asset of buyers and sellers, with buyers valuing the asset more
than sellers. This implies that, although buyers have all the bargaining power in the decentralized
market and therefore there is no holdup problem, trade in the decentralized market is ine¢ cient
when only the asset can be used as a means of payment.
When money is introduced, we obtain that, conditional on having brought money and asset into
the DM,4 buyers strictly prefer paying sellers using money rather than the asset. This is because
buyers value the asset relative to money more than sellers, and therefore buyers prefer to pay
using money only, as long as they are not too constrained. If buyers have too little real balances,
then they will use the asset as a means of payment as well. Hence, we obtain endogenously that
1A similar path has been followed in some non-search theoretic asset pricing models, e.g., Holmström and Tirole
(2001) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2005).
2See, for instance, Zhu (2007), Rocheteau (2008), and Waller (2008), for a similar OG setup.
3We assume that agents cannot commit to honor contracts, and since agents live for three subperiods they cannot
be punished should they renege on a risk-sharing contract in the last subperiod of their lives.
4and under mild conditions for monetary policy.
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money has better liquidity properties than the asset because buyers choose to pay using money
rst. The fact that buyers prefer to pay using money implies that money carries a greater liquidity
premium than the asset, and we therefore obtain that the asset strictly dominates money in terms
of expected rate of return, except at the Friedman rule. Since buyers are risk neutral with respect
to the dividend payment of the asset, they hold both the asset and money despite the rate of return
dominance of asset to money.
Regarding the impact of ination on asset prices when the monetary authority follows a sta-
tionary monetary policy in the sense that the ination rate is kept constant, our model delivers
that for low levels of ination the price of the asset, and therefore its real rate of return, is not
a¤ected by the rate of ination. This is because for low levels of ination the asset is not used as
a means of payment, only money is, and the price of the asset is given by its fundamental value,
which is the expected present value of its dividend ow. Hence, when the ination rate increases,
although buyersreal balances decrease, thereby reducing the quantity they can buy from sellers in
the DM, buyers will still not be using the asset to buy from sellers. This is because the di¤erenti-
ated relative valuation of the asset to money implies that the opportunity cost of using money in
terms of tomorrows expected e¤ort savings is too high compared to the utility benets of the extra
quantity of goods they can obtain in the DM. In other words, when the ination rate is low we
endogenously obtain a dichotomy : money is used as a means of payment in the DM,5 the asset is
used to transfer resources across periods, and the rate of return on money does not impact the real
rate of return on the asset. When the ination rate becomes large enough, real balances are so low
that buyers will then use the asset as a means of payment in complement to money. In this case
the asset will carry a liquidity premium as well, although it is smaller than that of money. In this
case, when the ination rate increases, because real balances fall, which constrains buyers further
in the DM, the liquidity premia on both money and the asset increase. Hence, the price of the
asset increases, thereby reducing its real rate of return. We therefore obtain a negative relationship
between ination and the assets real rate of return.
Our paper is related to papers by Engineer and Shi (1998) and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003)
who show that in a model of decentralized trade where agentspreferences over each others goods
is exogenously asymmetric, barter is ine¢ cient, even if agents can trade every period. This is
because the agents di¤erentiated valuation implies that the surplus of match is generically not
maximized. In their environments the introduction of money improves welfare because all agents
5Money is also used by old sellers in the CM.
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value it symmetrically, which enables agents to maximize the surplus of the match.6
Among the search-theoretic models of money dealing with asset prices mentioned above, the
most closely linked to our paper are that of Lagos and Rocheteau (2007), Geromichalos et al. (2007)
and Lester et al. (2008). However, in these papers agents would like to be able to use the asset, or
capital, as a means of payment in the DM, but either they do not have enough of it or they cannot
use it because of informational asymmetry. In our model it is the choice of buyers to use money over
the asset as a means of payment. This also means that the liquidity premium that money carries
over the asset is completely endogenous. Moreover, in this paper whether the price and real rate
of return on the asset, or capital in the case of Lagos and Rocheteau, is a¤ected by the ination
rate depends on whether the stock of the asset is large enough to carry out transactions in the
DM. In contrast, we obtain that the level of ination is what determines whether the asset price is
a¤ected by the ination rate. Finally, our paper is also related to the paper by Rocheteau (2008),
who obtains very similar results to ours, albeit in an environment with asymmetric information.
The paper is organized as follows. The environment is laid out in the next section. Section 3
considers the model without at money, and the model with at money is studied in section 4. The
implications of the monetary model in a stationary monetary policy environment is considered in
section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 The Environment
Time is discrete and the horizon innite. In each period two markets are opened sequentially: a
Centralized (Walrasian) Market (CM) and a Decentralized Market (DM). In each period the state
of the world is one of two possible states z 2 f1; 2g, and for the time being we assume that the
state follows an iid process such that the probability that the state is 1 is  2 (0; 1). The state of
the world for a given period is revealed before the CM opens.
We adopt an Overlapping-Generations structure: a unit mass of agents is born at the beginning
of each CM, and all of these agents die at the end of the next CM, i.e., agents live for three
subperiods. Discounting happens between periods and the common discount factor is  2 (0; 1).
We say agents are young in the rst two subperiods of their lives and old in the last subperiod.
Within each generation there are two types of agents: half are called buyers, indexed by b, while
6These results are those of Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003). Engineer and Shis (1998) results are more nuanced,
but as Berentsen and Rocheteau show the di¤erence in results come from some special assumptions made by Engineer
and Shi.
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the other half are called sellers, indexed by s.
In the rst subperiod of each date agents consume and produce a perishable consumption good
which is traded in the CM. The utility of consuming x units of the good is U(x) for all agents, and
we assume that U is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable, with
U(0) = 0 and limx!+1 U 0(x) = 0. To produce the good requires e¤ort, and e¤ort is turned into the
good one-for-one. The utility cost of supplying e¤ort h for both types while young is independent
of the state and is h, as it is for old buyers, whereas the cost of supplying h units of e¤ort for a
type-j agent, j 2 fs; bg, when the state of the world is z is j;zh. We assume7 that b;1 = b;2 = 1,
and s;1 < 1 < s;2, with
s;1 + (1  ) s;2 = 1,
so that both types of agents have the same expected disutility of e¤ort.8
In the second subperiod of each date trade is decentralized: each buyer is matched at random
with a seller. The cost of producing y units of the good for the seller is c(y) while the utility of the
buyer in consuming y is u(y). We assume that both u and c are twice continuously di¤erentiable with
u(0) = c(0) = 0, that u(y)  c(y) is strictly concave, and that limy!0 u0(y) = limy!+1 c0(y) = +1
and limy!+1 u0(y) = limy!0 c0(y) = 0. The terms of trade in the DM are determined by take-it-
or-leave-it o¤ers that buyers make to sellers.9
In addition to the two perishable consumption goods, there are two other non-perishable objects
in the economy. The rst is a Lucas tree (Lucas, 1978), which yields a state-dependent dividend
consisting of a quantity dz of consumption goods every period in the CM. It is assumed that
d1 > d2. There is also an intrinsically worthless object called at money. Both objects are perfectly
divisible and storable and can be traded freely in either markets. We assume that there does not
7 It is possible to instead assume that the di¤erence across the two groups of agents is in their marginal produc-
tivity of labor. The mechanics would be exactly the same, though the formulation would be more cumbersone for
computation and presentation purposes.
8We could have assumed more generally that s;1 < b;1  1  b;2 < s;2 with j;1+(1  ) j;2 = 1 for j = s; b,
but all that is required for our results to go through is that the seller has a greater variability in his disutility of e¤ort.
The assumption that both types of agents have the same expected disutility of e¤ort guarantees that both types of
agents have the same intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of e¤ort.
9 If we were to adopt the generalized Nash bargaining solution we would have to worry about the choice of buyers
regarding the part of their portfolio to bring into the DM because of the hold-up problem. See Geromichalos et
al. (2007) and Lester et al. (2008) for a discussion of the problem in a similar set-up, and Aruoba et al. (2007a)
for a general discussion of the hold-up problem in monetary models where terms of trade are determined through
bargaining.
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exist a technology keeping track of individualstrading histories, and that agents cannot commit to
honoring private contracts they have agreed to. These two assumptions rule out the use of credit
in the DM, for otherwise money cannot be essential.10 Furthermore, the lack of commitment also
implies that agents cannot credibly agree on ex ante risk-sharing contractual arrangements for the
last subperiod of their lives.
The Lucas tree is in xed supply while money is injected, or withdrawn, by the government
in the centralized market by lump-sum transfers, or taxes, to the young. Let A denote the xed
stock of the asset and Mt the quantity of money in period t. We consider di¤erent policies: we rst
consider stationary monetary policies where the money stock grows at a constant rate, so that real
balances and the ination rate across time and states. We then consider cases where the money
growth rate, and therefore the ination rate, is state-dependent. A monetary rule is a function F
that gives tomorrows stock of money for each state as a function of todays stock of money and
tomorrows state of the world. Formally, a monetary rule is
F : R ! R R
M 7!
cM1;cM2 .
3 The Economy without Fiat Money
Let us rst consider the equilibrium for an economy without money. The problem an agent faces in
the rst subperiod of his life is to choose how much to consume, work and asset to purchase (from
the old) in order to maximize his expected discounted lifetime utility. Since all young agents are
identical across periods and old agents will always sell all of their assets in the last CM, we have
that the demand and supply of asset in the CM are the same in all periods. It is therefore natural
to look for an equilibrium where the price of the asset is constant over time and independent of
the state. Formally, a type j agents problem, j = s; b, in his rst subperiod when the state of the
world is z is
Max
(x;h;a)

U(x)  h+W j(a)	 (1)
s.t. x = h   a,
equation (1) where W j(a) is the value of entering the DM with a units of asset,  is the price of
the asset, and it is assumed that the asset is traded ex dividend. For buyers and sellers we have
10See Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001).
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that
W b(a) = u(y) + Ebz hvb;bz(a  qa)i , and (2)
W s(a) =  c(y) + Ebz hvs;bz(a+ qa)i , (3)
where vj;bz(ba) is the value for type j agents of entering the last CM with ba units of assets when the
state is bz. Note that as long as the price of the asset is state-independent the value of entering the
DM is also independent of the state of the world in that period. Assuming that h > 0, we have
that an agent will choose to consume x such that U 0 (x) = 1, and the amount he chooses to work
depends on his asset choice: h(a) = x +  a. The rst-order condition, which is necessary and
su¢ cient, for the asset holding decision is
 W ja (a), = if a > 0. (4)
Let as ( ) and ab ( ) denote the asset holding choices of buyers and sellers for the price  , the
market clearing condition for the asset is
0:5as ( ) + 0:5ab ( ) = A (5)
Before moving on to the DM, let us consider the last CM of an agents life. If we denote by
vj;bz(ba) the value for a type j agent of entering the last subperiod of his life with ba units of assets
when the state of the world is bz, we have that
vj;bz(ba) =Max
(x;h)
n
U(x)  j;bzho (6)
s.t. x = h+

 + dbzba.
Assuming interiority of the solution for h, it follows that x = xjbz and h (ba) = xjbz    + dbz ba, where
U 0(xjbz) = j;bz.11 Hence, the expected value for a type j agent of entering the last CM of his life
with ba units of assets can be expressed as
vj(ba) = vj(0) + vjaba, (7)
where vj(0) = (U(xj1) j;1xj1)+(1  ) (U(xj2) j;2xj2) and vja = j;1
 
 + d1

+(1  ) j;2   + d2
is the constant marginal value of the asset to a type j agent. The last expression can be simplied
to vja =  + d
j
with d
s  s;1d1 + (1  ) s;2d2 and db = d  d1 + (1  ) d2 being the expected
value of the dividend for sellers and buyers.
11This naturally requires that xbz    + dbz ba, which will be veried (guaranteed) later.
8
It is worth noting that the marginal value of the asset for buyers is greater than that of sellers,
i.e., vba > v
s
a. In fact, d > d
s
. The intuition for this di¤erence in valuation of the asset is simple:
the asset pays a high dividend when sellers have a low disutility of e¤ort, and therefore do not
mind too much exerting e¤ort, whereas the asset pays a low dividend in the state when it is the
most costly for them to work. In other words the asset is a bad one for sellers for self-insurance
against e¤ort cost because the correlation is of the wrong sign. Buyers, contrary to sellers, do not
face any variation in their marginal disutility of e¤ort, and therefore the dividend payouts are not
correlated with their disutility of e¤ort.
In the DM, when a buyer with quantity of asset a meets a seller with quantity of asset ea, the
surplus for the buyer is12
Sb(y; a) = u(y) + Ebz hvb;bz(a  qa)  vb;bz(a)i ,
where qa is the quantity of asset the buyer transfers to the seller in exchange for the quantity y of
the good. From (7), the above expression can be rewritten as
Sb(y; a) = u(y)  vbaqa.
Symmetrically, the surplus for a seller can be written as
Ss(y) =  c(y) + vsaqa.
We therefore have that when the buyer and seller have asset holdings a and ea respectively, the
terms of trades (y; qa) solve
Max(y;qa) S
b(y; a) (8)
s:t: Ss(y)  0 () , qa  a (a)
where the terms in brackets denote the Lagrange multipliers for the respective constraints..
Denition 1 An non-monetary equilibrium is a price for the asset  , asset holdings for sellers
and buyers as and ab and terms of trade for the DM (y; qa), such that: (i) given  , aj satises (4)
for j 2 fs; bg,  is such that (5) is satised; and (ii) (y; qa) solves (8).
12Here we are anticipating the result that the terms of trade in the DM do not depend on the sellers portfolio.
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3.1 Terms of Trade in the DM
In this section we will derive the terms of trade in the DM, taking as given the asset choices of
agents. When matched with a seller, a buyer makes him a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, that is the terms
of trade solve (6). The rst-order conditions13 are
FOC (y) : u0(y) = c0(y); (9)
FOC (qa) : v
b
a + a  vsa, = for qa > 0. (10)
Since the marginal gains from trading the good are innitely large at y = 0, clearly the two agents
will trade, provided that the buyer holds a non-empty portfolio. Hence, provided the buyer comes
into the DM with some asset, the second FOC holds with equality and can be rewritten as
FOC (qa) :
vba
vsa
+
a
vsa
= .
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In an equilibrium without money, when the buyers asset holding is a, the terms of trade
in the DM (y; qa) are such that:
y = minfc 1(vsaa); y(a)g, and qa = minfa; a(a)g, (11)
where a  vba=vsa, y(a) solves `(y; ) = 0 with `(y; )   1 [u0(y)=c0(y)]   1, and a(a) 
c(y(a))=vsa.
Proof. In the Appendix.
If a buyer is not constrained by his asset holding he will purchase the quantity y(a) from the
seller he is matched with. This requires that he holds a quantity of asset of at least a(a). If
a buyer holds less than a(a) when he comes into the DM he will be constrained, in which case
he gives away his entire asset holding, i.e., qa = a and receives in exchange y = c 1(vsaa), the
maximum quantity the seller is willing to produce for vsaa.
In this environment without money the buyer will never purchase the e¢ cient quantity y from
the buyer, y being such that u0(y) = c0(y). In fact, a buyer is willing to exchange the asset against
goods in the DM up to the point where his marginal gain is equal to his marginal opportunity cost,
which is the expected value of e¤ort the marginal unit of asset would have saved him. However, to
13The Lagrangian is concave for its Hessian is negative semi-denite.
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obtain a quantity y of goods in the DM the buyer has to transfer qa = c(y)=vsa units of asset to
the buyer. The marginal cost of obtaining y is therefore
vba
c0(y)
vsa
,
whereas the marginal gain is u0(y). The maximum quantity a buyer is willing to purchase from a
seller is therefore y(a), and is such that
u0(y(a))
c0(y(a))
=
vba
vsa
. (12)
Even though we have not solved yet for the price of the asset, it is clear that vba > v
s
a. It follows
that y(a) < y.
3.2 The Asset Holding Decisions
Now that we have established the terms of trade in the DM, we turn our attention to the choice
of asset holdings for the buyers and sellers in the rst subperiod of their lives. The rst order
conditions for buyers and sellers are respectively
 W ba(a), = if ab > 0;
 W sa (a), = if as > 0.
(13)
When the agent is a seller his asset holdings has no incidence on the terms of trade in the DM, and
W s(a) =  c(y) + Ebz hvs;bz(a+ qa)i ,
and therefore the expected marginal value for the asset in the rst CM is
W sa (a) = v
s
a. (14)
In this case the marginal value of the asset is simply the discounted expected value of the asset next
period. This is because when an agent is a seller in the DM he does not need the asset to carry out
transactions there, and therefore the asset does not provide him with any liquidity services. Hence,
a sellers valuation is based solely on the dividend payouts in the next CM.
For buyers we have
W b(a) = u(y) + Ebz hvb;bz(a  qa)i ,
and the quantity of asset he has brought with him into the DM matters because he will need some
asset to purchase from the seller he has been matched with. We have the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 In a meeting where the buyers asset holding is a,
W ba(a) = v
b
a [1 + L(y; a)] , (15)
where L(y; )  maxf0; `(y; )g is the liquidity premium.
Proof. In the Appendix.
If the value of the buyers asset holding in the eyes of the seller is at least equal to a(a), then
the buyer is able to purchase the quantity y(a) from the seller, and in that case if the buyer
brings some more asset into the DM the terms of trade will not change. Therefore, the expected
value of the extra units of asset brought in is simply vba, i.e., the discounted expected price of the
asset next period. If, however, the buyer did not have enough asset initially to purchase the desired
quantity y(a), then if he increases the value of the portfolio brought into the DM he will increase
the quantity of good he can purchase from the seller, and this increases his utility to the tune of
(1=a) (u
0(y)=c0(y)). The term L(y; a) captures the liquidity premium that the asset yields in
excess of the pure nancial returns.
Plugging (14) and (15) into the FOCs (13) yield
  vba [1 + `(y; a)  1 fa < a(a)g] , = if ab > 0;
  vsa, = if as > 0.
(16)
Since vba > v
s
a it follows that a
b = A, as = 0 and  = vba [1 + L(y; a)]. Hence, if the stock of asset
in the economy is large enough for buyers to be able to purchase the desired quantity of good y(a)
in the DM, then the asset does not carry any liquidity premium, in which case buyersmarginal
valuation of the asset is simply vba. If the stock of asset is not large enough, then the asset carries
a liquidity premium L(y; a) > 0 and buyers value the asset in excess of vba. In either case buyers
value the asset more than sellers, and therefore are willing to pay more for it. We then have the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique steady-state equilibrium without money. There exists eA
solving

h
d+ (1  )ds
i
1  
eA = c(ey)
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such that:
(i) if A  eA, then  = e  = d=(1  ), y = ey  y(ea), and qa = eA, where
ea = d
d+ (1  )ds ;
(ii) if A < eA, then  =  (A) > e , y = ey(A) < ey, and qa = A, with  0 (A) < 0 and ey0(A) > 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Hence, we obtain that the economy without at money is always ine¢ cient because of the
di¤erence in valuations of the asset of buyers and sellers. As in Engineer and Shi (1998) and
Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003), this ine¢ ciency arising from the di¤erence in valuations of the
asset suggest that, as we will indeed show, that the introduction of money in this environment can
increase welfare, and therefore make money essential despite being return dominated by the asset.
4 The Economy with Fiat Money
We will now consider the economy with at money in addition to the Lucas tree. In this case the
problem an agent faces in the rst subperiod of his life is to choose how much to consume and work
and what portfolio to bring into the DM in order to maximize his expected discounted lifetime
utility. It is still true that all young agents are identical across periods and that old agents will
always sell all of their assets in the last CM of their lives. Moreover, since we are considering only
monetary rules where the money stock growth can depend on next periods state but not on todays
state, we are considering equilibria where real balances are the constant in all periods and states,
so that, focusing on stationary monetary rules, the price of the asset are both state-independent.
We therefore have that a type j agents problem in his rst subperiod in either state of the world
is
Max
(x;h;a;m)

U(x)  h+W j(a;m)	 (17)
s.t. x = h   a  m,
where W j(a;m) is the value of entering the DM with portfolio (a;m),  and  are the prices of the
asset and money respectively (it is still assumed that the asset is traded ex dividend). Assuming
the solution for h is interior, we have that a young agent will choose to consume x such that
U 0 (x) = 1 in each state, and the amount he chooses to work is h(a;m) = x +  a + m. The
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rst-order conditions, which are necessary and su¢ cient, for the asset and money holding decisions
are
  W ja (a;m), = for aj > 0, (18)
  W jm(a;m), = for mj > 0, (19)
Let aj ( ; ) and mj ( ; ) denote the asset and money choices of type j agents given the prices of
asset and money are  and . The market clearing conditions for the asset and money in either
state are
0:5as ( ; ) + 0:5ab ( ; ) = A, and (20)
0:5ms ( ; ) + 0:5mb ( ; ) = M , (21)
where M is the stock of money for that period.
Before moving on to the DM we will again rst consider the last CM of an agents life. Denoting
by vj;bz(ba; bm) the value for a type j agent of entering the last subperiod of his life with portfolio
(ba; bm) when the state of the world is bz, we have that
vj;bz(ba; bm) =Max
(x;h)
n
U(x)  j;bzho (22)
s.t. x = h+

 bz + dbzba+ bz bm.
Assuming interiority of the solution for h, it follows that x = xbz and hbz(ba; bm) = xbz  bz + dbzba 
+bz bm, where U 0(xbz) = j;bz.14 Hence, the expected value for a type j agent of entering the last CM
of his life with portfolio (ba; bm) can be expressed as
vj(ba; bm) = vj(0; 0) + vjaba+ vjm bm, (23)
where vj(0; 0) = 
 
U(x1)  j;1x1

+ (1  )  U(x2)  j;2x2, vjm = j;11 + (1  ) j;22 is the
constant marginal value of the money, and vja is dened as before. This time it is not necessarily
the case that buyers value the asset more than sellers. This is because the price of the asset can
be state-dependent, and if the price of the asset in state 1 is su¢ ciently smaller than in state 2 we
can obtain that sellers actually value the asset more than buyers.
In the DM, we continue to assume that the buyer makes a takeit-or-leave-it o¤er to the seller.
When a buyer with portfolio (ba; bm) meets a seller (we now know his portfolio is irrelevant for the
14This naturally requires that xbz    bz + dbz ba+ bz bm, which will be veried (guaranteed) later.
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terms of trade as long as interiority is guaranteed), the surplus for the buyer is
Sb(y; a;m) = u(y) + Ebz hvb;bz(a  qa;m  qm)  vb;bz(a;m)i ,
where qm is the quantity of money the buyer transfers to the seller. From (26), the above expression
can be rewritten as
Sb(y; a;m) = u(y)  

vbaqa + v
b
mqm

.
Symmetrically, the surplus for a seller can be written as
Ss(y) =  c(y) +  (vsaqa + vsmqm) .
We therefore have that when the buyer has portfolio (a;m), the terms of trades (y; qa; qm) solve
Max(y;qa) S
b(y; a;m) (24)
s:t: Ss(y)  0 () , qa  a (a) , qm  m (m) .
where the terms in brackets denote the Lagrange multipliers for the respective constraints.
Denition 2 A monetary equilibrium is a price for the asset  , asset and money holdings for
sellers and buyers
 
as;ms; ab;mb

, and terms of trade in the DM (y; qa; qm), such that: (i) given
 and the monetary rule F ,
 
aj ;mj

satises (18) and (19) for j 2 fs; bg, and (20) and (21) are
satised; and (ii) (y; qa; qm) solves (24).
4.1 Terms of Trade in the DM and the Essentiality of Money
In this section we will derive the terms of trade in the DM, taking as given the portfolios that
agents bring in. The rst-order conditions for the buyers maximization problem are
FOC (y) : u0(y) = c0(y); (25)
FOC (qa) : v
b
a + a  vsa, = if qa > 0; and (26)
FOC (qm) : v
b
m + m  vsm, = if qm > 0. (27)
Since the marginal gains from trading the good are innitely large at y = 0, clearly the two agents
will trade, provided that the buyer holds a non-empty portfolio. And since the seller needs to be
compensated by the buyer for the goods he will provide him with, we therefore have that at least
one of the last two FOCs holds with equality.
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The last two FOCs can be reexpressed as follows:
FOC (qa) :
vba
vsa
+
a
vsa
 ; and
FOC (qm) :
vbm
vsm
+
m
vsm
 .
One can see from the above FOCs that the buyer is indi¤erent between using money or the
asset as a means of payment if his relative valuation of the asset to money is identical to the sellers
relative valuation of the asset to money, i.e.,
vba
vbm
=
vsa
vsm
.
In this case only the total expected value of the portfolio in the next CM matters. Dene by
!(qa; qm) = v
s
aqa + v
s
aqm the expected value of the transfer (qa; qm) for the seller. When the buyer
has portfolio (a;m); !(a;m) denotes the value of the entire portfolio of the buyer in the eyes of the
seller. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If the buyer and the seller have the same relative valuation of asset to money, i.e.,
a  vba=vsa = vbm=vsm  m, and the buyers portfolio is (a;m), the terms of trade (y; qa; qm) are
such that
y = minfc 1(!(a;m); y (m)g, and !(qa; qm) = minf! (a;m) ; !(m)g,
where y(m) solves `(y; m) = 0, and !(m)  c(y(m))=.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As mentioned above, when the buyer and the seller have the same relative valuation of money
to asset the buyer is indi¤erent between using money or the asset as a means of payment, as they
have, in a sense, the same "exchange rate," va=vm, of asset to money. When, in addition, the buyer
and the seller value each means of payment the same way, i.e.,  = 1, we have that, provided the
buyers portfolio value is large enough for him not to be constrained, i.e., !(a;m)  !(1), the
buyer will purchase the e¢ cient quantity y from the seller.
However, when the buyer and the seller have the same relative valuation of asset to money, but
 6= 1, they need not be trading the e¢ cient quantity even when the buyer is unconstrained. In
fact, in this case one can have that the buyer and the seller do not value each means of payment
the same way since  6= 1, which implies that when the buyer is unconstrained he will purchase the
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quantity y() from the seller, with y() > y for  < 1, and y() < y when  > 1. If we consider
the case  > 1, the buyer values money and the asset more than the seller, whereas when  = 1
they both value the two means of payment the same way. Hence, when  > 1 the seller is willing
to produce less than when  = 1 for the same transfer, or in other words it is more costly for the
buyer to purchase a given quantity, and he will therefore buy less.
When the value of the buyers portfolio is not large enough to purchase y(), he is constrained,
and uses all of his portfolio in exchange for goods: when ! (a;m) < !() the buyer gives his
entire portfolio to the seller, and in exchange the latter is willing to produce the quantity y =
c 1(! (a;m)) < y(). Note that when  < 1, since in this case y() > y, it is possible that the
e¢ cient quantity of goods will be produced even though the buyer is constrained.
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When the buyer and the seller have di¤erent relative valuations of asset to money, the buyer
has a strict preference for using one of the two as a means of payment. When the buyer values the
asset relative to money more than the seller, i.e.,
vba
vbm
>
vsa
vsm
,
the buyer strictly prefers to use money as a means of payment.
Lemma 4 In a meeting where the buyer values the asset relative to money more than the seller,
i.e., a > m, and the buyers portfolio is (a;m), there exist m(m) and m(a), m(m) > m(a),
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such that the terms of trade (y; qa; qm) are:
(y; qa; qm) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(y(m); 0;m(m)) , if m  m(m);
(y(0;m); 0;m) , if m 2 [m(a);m(m));
(y(a); qa(m; a);m) , if m < m(a) and !(a;m)  !(a);
(y(a;m); a;m) , if m < m(a) and !(a;m) < !(a),
where m() = c(y()=(vsm), y(qa; qm) = c 1[ (vsmqm + vsaqa)], and
qa(m; a) =
c(y(a))
vsa
  v
s
m
vsa
m. (28)
Proof. In the Appendix.
Let us lay out the intuition for the result. First, it is obvious that since the buyer has all the
bargaining power he will o¤er terms of trade to the seller that will make him indi¤erent between
trading or not, i.e., Ss(y) = 0. The transfer (qa; qm) made by the buyer to the seller to obtain
a quantity y of the good satises vsaqa + v
s
mqm = c(y)=. Using this, the surplus to the buyer in
obtaining the quantity y is
Sb(y; a;m) = u(y)  c(y) v
b
aqa + v
b
mqm
vsaqa + v
s
mqm
.
Hence, if we abstract from the value that the buyer holds in his portfolio for each asset, it follows
that the buyer prefers to use money rather than the asset to pay the seller: if the buyer uses only
money, i.e., qa = 0 and qm > 0, from the above expression we obtain that the surplus in obtaining
y is
u(y)  c(y) v
b
m
vsm
,
whereas if he uses only the asset the surplus is
u(y)  c(y) v
b
a
vsa
.
However, we have that buyersvaluation of the asset relative to money exceeds that of sellers, i.e.,
vba
vbm
>
vsa
vsm
,
which clearly implies that the surplus of the buyer is larger when he uses money. Hence, it is only
if the buyer does not have enough money in his portfolio to purchase the desired quantity from
the seller that he will consider using the asset as a means of payment. In particular, if the buyer
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has in his portfolio a quantity of money m  m(m), where m(m) the quantity of money for
which the buyer is not constrained, then the buyer obtains y(m) by transferring m(m) to the
seller. If, however, the buyer has marginally less than m(m), he will use all of his money but he
will not be using his asset regardless of how much asset he has. The reason for this is that since
his relative valuation of the asset exceeds that of the seller, i.e., vsa=v
s
m < v
b
a=v
b
m, and for m close
enough to m(m) the buyers instantaneous marginal utility gain from using the asset to purchase
some extra good u0(y) is less than the discounted marginal utility loss from transferring the asset
to pay for the additional good purchased, which is (vsa=v
b
a)c
0(y), because for y marginally less than
y(m) we have that
u0(y)
c0(y)
=
vbm
vsm
+  <
vba
vsa
,  > 0 small.
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Figure 2
Then as the money holdings of the buyer decrease further, the quantity he can buy from the
seller decreases. When m reaches m(a), the quantity that can be purchased by the buyer becomes
y(a) such that u0(y(a))=c0(y(a)) = vsa=vba, i.e., the marginal benet of consumption becomes
equal to the marginal cost of nancing additional consumption with the asset. Hence, when m
falls below m(a) a buyer of type j will use all of his money and some of his asset to purchase
consumption from the seller up to the point where the cost of using the asset equals marginal
utility of consumption. The quantity of asset transferred is given by (28), i.e., the quantity of
asset transferred exactly complements the money holdings that the buyer transferred to the seller
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in order to buy y(a). Naturally, the buyer might not have enough asset holdings to purchase all
of these extra units of consumption, in which case he will give all his portfolio to the buyer, i.e.,
qa = a and qm = m, and in exchange he obtains y < y(a) such that c(y) = (vsaa + vsmm). The
fact that money can increase the quantity traded in the DM by increasing the size of the surplus,
which here is captured entirely by buyers, is reminiscent of Engineer and Shi (1998) and Berentsen
and Rocheteau (2003).
Symmetrically, when the buyer values the asset relative to money less than the seller, the buyer
has a strict preference in using the asset as a means of payment, and he will therefore rst use the
asset to buy from the seller, and he will use money as a means of payments only if his portfolio
does not contain enough asset to buy the desired quantity of good from the seller. The results in
this case are perfectly symmetric to the previous case, and we have the following lemma illustrated
with Figure 3.
Lemma 5 If a < m and the buyers portfolio is (a;m), there exist a(a) and a(m) such that
the terms of trade (y; qa; qm) are:
(y; qa; qm) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(y(a); a(a); 0) , if a  a(a);
(y(a; 0); a; 0) , if a 2 [a(m); a(a));
(y(m); a; qm(a; m)) , if a < a(m) and !(a;m)  !(m);
(y(a;m); a;m) , if a < a(m) and !(a;m) < !(m),
where a() = c(y())=(vsa), and
qm(a; m) =
c(y(m))
vsm
  v
s
a
vsm
a. (29)
From lemmas 4 and 5, note that when the buyer and the seller have di¤erent relative valuations
of asset to money the quantity of goods the buyer purchases from the seller can exceed the e¢ cient
quantity y. This ine¢ ciency is coming from the fact that the buyer and the seller can value
di¤erently the means of payment. For instance, when the buyer values the asset relative to money
more than the seller, the buyer purchase rst by using money. And if the buyer values money less
than the seller, i.e., if vbm < v
s
m, then m < 1, and therefore the quantity of good traded if the
buyer is not constrained by his portfolio is y(m) > y. This type of ine¢ ciency does not exist
in general in search-theoretic models of money because even though the buyer and seller value the
good exchanged di¤erently, they value the means of payment the same way. A notable exception
20
is Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003).
Figure 3
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4.2 The Optimal Portfolio Choices
Now that we have established the terms of trade for the di¤erent possible types of meetings in the
DM, we turn our attention to the agentschoice of portfolio (a;m) in the rst CM of their lives.
The rst order conditions for a type-j agents problem in either state are
a :  W ja (a;m), = if a > 0;
m :  W jm(a;m), = if m > 0.
There are potentially three cases to consider depending on whether buyers value the asset relatively
to money more than sellers. However, we will be considering only one of the three possible cases,
that is the case where buyers value the asset relative to money more than sellers. There are at
least two reasons to focus on this case. First, for the two other cases to exist requires that the price
of the asset is su¢ ciently negatively correlated with its dividend, which seems unnatural. In fact,
if the price of the assets state-independent, then buyers value the asset more than sellers. Second
and foremost, when buyers value the asset relative to money less than or the same as buyers, then
buyers will use the asset rst as a means of payment which implies that money will be essential
only if the stock of asset is not large enough for buyers to purchase the desired quantity of goods
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in the DM. Since this paper aims at showing that at money can be valued even when the stock
of asset is large, we focus on the case where this can happen, and this requires buyers to value the
asset relative to money more than sellers.
4.2.1 Sellers
When the agent is a seller, his portfolio has no incidence on the terms of trade in the DM, and
W s(a;m) =  c(y) + Ebz hvs;bz(a+ qa;m+ qm)i ,
where bz denotes the state next period. The expected marginal values of each portfolio component
are therefore given by
a : W sa (a;m) = v
s
a;
m : W sm(a;m) = v
s
m.
The marginal value of money for sellers is therefore simply the expected discounted value of money
next period. This is because when an agent is a seller in the DM he does not need money nor the
asset to carry out transactions there, and therefore neither money nor the asset provide him with
any liquidity services. Hence, a sellers valuations of both elements of his portfolio are based solely
on their payouts.
4.2.2 Buyers
When an agent is a buyer, the quantities of money and asset he has brought with him into the DM
matter because he will need either money, or both money and the asset, to purchase from the seller
he has been matched with. The marginal value of the component i of the portfolio, i 2 fa;mg, is
given by
W bi (a;m) = Ebzvb;bzi + dydi u0(y) +
dqa
di
Ebz @vb;bz
@qa
+
dqm
di
Ebz @vb;bz
@qm
.
The rst component of the marginal value of component i of the portfolio is the discounted expected
marginal price of the component next period. But the extra units of i being brought into the DM
can increase the quantity of the good the buyer can purchase from the seller, in which case the
buyers marginal value is enhanced by (dy=di)u0(y), minus the utility cost of these extra units of
the special good [explain]
(dqa=di) Ebz h@vb;bz=@qai+ (dqm=di) Ebz h@vb;bz=@qmi .
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If the buyer already has enough money in his portfolio to purchase the desired quantity of good
from the seller, the additional quantity of money or asset brought in the DM will not be used there
and will instead be brought forward to the next CM. If instead the buyer was constrained by the
value of his money holding, then bringing more money or asset can help in buying more from the
seller. But as established in lemma 4, it is not always true that bringing more of the asset will
translate into a greater quantity of good transacted. In fact, we have shown that when the buyers
relative valuation of asset to money is greater than that of the seller, then the buyer strictly prefers
using money as a means of payment. In particular, if his money holding is not too small he might
prefer not to use the asset to purchase from the seller even though he is constrained by his money
holdings. Hence, we should expect that dqm=dm  0, and likewise dqa=da  0.
We have moreover shown that in some cases the buyer will use all of his money, and use some of
his asset, in order to purchase a specic quantity of the good. In this case, when the buyer brings
more money into the DM he will use this extra quantity of money to purchase the same quantity
of good from the seller, and money will therefore be used as a substitute for the asset. Hence, we
should expect that dqa=dm  0 and dqm=da = 0.
Lemma 6 When a > m and the buyers portfolio is (a;m):
W ba(a;m) = v
b
a [1 + `(y; a)  1 fm < m(a) and !(a;m) < !(a)g] , and
W bm(a;m) = v
b
m [1 + `(y; m)  1 fm < m(m)g] .
Proof. In the Appendix.
The detailed expression for W bm(a;m) is
W bm(a;m) = v
b
m[1 + `(y; m)  1 fm 2 [m(a);m(m))g
+

vsm
vbm
vba
vsa
  1

| {z }
`(y(a);m)
 1 fm < m(a) and !(a;m)  !(a)g
+`(y; m)  1 fm < m(a) and !(a;m) < !(a)g].
Note that for the sake of notation we have not indexed the quantity of good exchanged, but naturally
the quantity changes with the portfolio composition and value that the buyer brings in the DM.
When the value of the buyers money holdings is more than m(m), then the buyer can purchase
the desired quantity y(m) from the seller, and therefore neither money nor the asset bear any
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liquidity premium. If the buyer holds less money, but more than the quantity m(a), then he
is not able to purchase y(m) but he is still not willing to use the asset as a means of payment
yet. This is because the cost to him is too large since the seller values the asset less than him.
In this situation the buyer increases the amount he can purchase from the seller only if he brings
extra money in. That is why only money bears a liquidity premium `(y; m) in this case. The same
reasoning applies if the portfolio of the buyer is such that m < m(a) and !(a;m)  !(a) since in
this case he purchases y(a) from the seller, and if he brings extra cash he will use it to reduce his
use of the asset but not to increase the quantity of special good consumed. And if he brings some
extra asset, it will not change the terms of trade. However, if the portfolio the buyer is holding on
to has a total value, in the eye of the seller, equal to !(a), then he can purchase only y(a), which
is such that u0(y(a)) = c0(y(a)) (vba=vsa). Hence, if !(a;m) < !(a), we have that even if the
buyer uses all his portfolio he can at most purchase y such that u0(y) > c0(y) j;ka . Therefore, the
buyer is happy to use the asset to purchase from the seller and both the asset and money bear a
liquidity premium. It is worth noting that, even though both money and the asset bear a liquidity
premium when !(a;m) < !(a), the premium is not the same for both. In fact, `(y; a) < `(y; m),
and therefore moneys liquidity premium is larger than that of the asset, which is quite intuitive:
the buyer prefers to use money as a means of payment because of the di¤erence in their relative
marginal values for the asset, and therefore money dominates the asset in the provision of liquidity
services.
4.2.3 The FOCs
The rst order conditions governing the optimal portfolio decisions for seller and buyers in either
state of the world can therefore be written respectively as
a :   vsa, = if as > 0;
m :   vsm, = if ms > 0,
(30)
and
a :   vba [1 + L(y; a)] , = if ab > 0;
m :   vbm [1 + L(y; m)] , = if mb > 0.
(31)
The presence of an aggregate shock to the economy means that there might be a role for a
monetary policy that is not stationary in the sense that it induces a constant ination rate. In this
paper we restrict ourselves to stationary policies in that the growth of the money stock is constant
across periods and states, inducing a constant ination rate.
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5 Stationary Monetary Policy
In this section we consider the standard monetary policy of a constant money growth rate. Let us
denote by  the growth rate of the money stock. Since we focus on equilibria where real balances
are constan, i.e., M = bcM , this implies that  is also the ination rate , i.e., 1+  = =b. In this
case, we have that, given a current value for money and the money stock of  and M , the value of
money and money stock next period are given by b1 = b2 = b = = (1 + ) and cM = (1 + )M ,
so that
vbm = v
s
m =
b.
If follows straightforwardly from the FOCs (30) and (31) for agents rst CM that the fact that the
ination rate is constant and state-independent also implies that the price of the asset is constant
and state-independent. This in turn implies that vba =  + d, and that v
s
a =  + d
s
. The rst order
conditions for the portfolio decisions for sellers and buyers are therefore state independent and can
be rewritten for sellers as
a :   

 + d
s

, = if as > 0;
m : 1 +   , = if ms > 0,
(32)
and for buyers as
a :      + d [1 + L(y; a)] , = if ab > 0;
m : 1 +    [1 + L(y; m)] , = if mb > 0.
(33)
However, vba =  + d > v
s
a =  + d
s
, implying that ab = A and as = 0. Moreover, in any monetary
equilibrium such that  > F =    1, if such a monetary equilibrium exists, then we must have
that mb = M and ms = 0. For  = F we consider the limit as  ! F , and therefore at the
Friedman rule we also obtain that mb =M and ms = 0. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) For any stock of asset A there exists an ination rate (A) > F such that for
all  2  F ; (A) a (unique) monetary equilibrium exists. (A) is continuous and such that
(A) =
8<:  > F , for all A  eA, and(A) > , with  0(A)  0, for all A < eA;
(ii) For all  2 [F ; ) money serves as the unique means of payment and  () = e .
And for all  2 [; (A)] both money and the asset serve as means of payments, and for all
 2 (; (A)],  () > e , with @ ()=@ > 0.
Proof. In the Appendix.
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The rst part of the proposition says that the maximum ination rate for which a monetary
equilibrium exists, (A), is strictly decreasing in the stock of asset A, for A less than the cuto¤valueeA that is su¢ cient for buyers to purchase the quantity desired ey in a non-monetary equilibrium.
And for A equal or greater than the cuto¤ value eA the maximum possible ination rate is  > F .
(see gure 4).
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This is in contrast with the results in Lagos and Rocheteau (2007) and Geromichalos et al. (2007).
They obtain respectively that if the e¢ cient stock of capital for production in the CM or the stock
of Lucas trees are not large enough for these assets to fully play the role of means of payment,
then the upper bound on the maximum ination rate to exist is strictly greater than that of the
Friedman rule, and this upper bound increases as the e¢ cient stock of capital or stock of Lucas
trees decreases. However, if the e¢ cient stock of capital for production in the CM or the stock of
Lucas trees are large enough for these assets to fully play the role of means of payment, then a
monetary equilibrium exists only at the Friedman rule, and hence, money is not essential.
Hence, contrary to these papers we obtain that for any level of stock of asset a monetary
equilibrium exists away from the Friedman rule. The reason why a monetary equilibrium exists
away from the Friedman rule even when the stock of asset is large enough for buyers to purchase
the desired quantity ey in the DM in a non-monetary equilibrium is as follows. The quantity ey
that buyers desire to purchase in the DM in a non-monetary equilibrium is less than the e¢ cient
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quantity y. The ine¢ ciency of the non-monetary equilibrium lies in the di¤erent valuations that
buyers and sellers have of the asset because of the di¤erent correlation properties of their disutility
of e¤ort and the rate of return of the asset. When the monetary authority follows a policy delivering
a state-independent ination rate, buyers and sellers value money the same way, and hence buyers
value the asset relative to money more than sellers. At the Friedman rule it is costless for buyers
to bring money into the DM and they bring enough real balances to purchase the e¢ cient quantity
y. When the ination rate increases and lies in the interval
 
F ; 

, although it becomes costly
to carry money for buyers, the cost of ination is not too large in that the level of real balances
that buyers are bringing into the DM enables them to purchase a quantity y() greater than ey.
Hence, for levels of ination less than the cuto¤ value  buyers are better o¤ using money than
not. Note that, as highlighted above, this is true for any size of the stock of asset. This is because
in the DM buyers will use only money as a means of payment.
The cuto¤ ination rate  is such that buyers bring into the DM real balances to purchase the
quantity ey, at which point buyers become indi¤erent between money or the asset in the DM. If
the ination rate increases further, then a monetary equilibrium no longer exists when the stock of
asset is large, i.e., greater than eA, because the cost of ination becomes too large and buyers are
better o¤ using the asset as the unique means of payment. When the stock of asset is less thaneA, then a monetary equilibrium exists for ination rates greater than  because the stock of asset
is not large enough for buyers to be able to purchase ey in the DM. Hence, buyers are willing to
accept a larger ination rate.
Regarding the asset pricing implication of our model, we obtain that if the ination rate is no
more than  the asset does not carry any liquidity premium, and therefore its price is equal to
its fundamental value, that of the expected discounted value of dividends. It is worth noting that
this result holds no matter how large the stock of the asset is. This is because when  is no greater
than  only money is used as a means of payment and therefore only money can carry a liquidity
premium. Ination matters for the price of the asset only if its serves as a means of payment
through its impact on the liquidity premium. This happens only when the ination rate is greater
than , which itself requires the stock of asset to be smaller than eA.
There is another important result that our model delivers: a form of Rate of Return Dominance,
RRD hereafter. In fact, the rate of return on money, excluding the liquidity premium, is
Rm () =
b  

=
 
1 + 
, (34)
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whereas the expected rate of return on the asset is
Ra () =
 
 (A; ) + d
   (A; )
 (A; )
=
d
 (A; )
. (35)
When the ination rate is less than  the price of the asset is e  = d=(1  ), in which case (35)
simplies to
Ra () =
1  

. (36)
It is clear that for  2  F ;  we have that Rm < Ra, i.e., we obtain RRD in expected terms.
When  > , using the FOCs (30) and (31) for the agentsportfolio decisions, we obtain that the
price of the asset is given by
 () =
1 + 
   d
s
, (37)
and therefore for  2 [; (A)] we have that
Ra () =
 
1 + 
 d
d
s > Rm () . (38)
We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For any ination rate  > F , we have that Ra () > Rm (). Moreover, for all
 2 (F ; ), R0a () = 0, and for  > , R0a () < 0.
This is a form of RRD because buyers hold money which is dominated by the asset. We would
like to highlight that, although the asset dominates money only in expected terms and not for every
state, buyers are risk neutral agents with regards to the risk related to the asset, and in that sense
the result is really a form of RRD. In fact, the assets dividends and what they obtain from the sale
of assets enable buyers to work less in the last CM of their lives. And since buyers do not face any
variability in the disutility of e¤ort, they care only about the expected value of the dividend they
will receive. We obtain a RRD in this model because the asset is an ine¢ cient means of payment
due to the di¤erence in valuations of buyers and sellers. Buyers are therefore willing to hold on to
a dominated asset because it is a better means of payment. In our model, money is a better means
of payment because buyers and sellers value it the same way, and therefore buyers can purchase a
greater quantity in the DM that they would if they were to use the asset.
For the reader who is not convinced that we have obtained a RRD, consider our model but
replace sellers by agents with a marginal disutility of e¤ort of 1 in each state in the last CM of
their lives. The portfolio decision of buyers in this modied version of the model is almost identical
28
to that of agents in Geromichalos et al. (2007), and money is essential only if the stock of asset is
not large enough for buyers to purchase the e¢ cient quantity y in the DM. In any case the rate of
return on the asset is equal to the rate of return of money. This shows that the stochastic nature
of the dividend is of no importance by itself.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a model where money and an asset endogenously coexist despite money being
return dominated by the asset. Agents carry money for it endogenously o¤ers better liquidity
properties than the asset for decentralized trades. This is because buyers value the asset relative
to money more than sellers, and they therefore strictly prefer to use money rather than the asset
as a means of payment.
It was shown that for low levels of ination a dichotomy is obtained: money is used as the only
means of payments in the DM, and the asset is used solely to transfer across periods. Hence, the
asset does not carry any liquidity premium, and its price and rate of return are independent of
the ination rate. When the ination rate increases enough, buyersreal balances are so low that
buyers start using the asset as a means of payment in addition to money despite sellers not valuing
it as much as buyers. In this case the asset carries a liquidity premium as well, albeit smaller than
that of money, and the asset price and real rate of return are a¤ected by the ination rate: the price
of the asset increases with ination, and therefore its real rate of retrun is negatively correlated
with the ination rate.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
The rst order conditions for problem (8), which are necessary and su¢ cient since the Hessian
for the Lagrangian is negative semi-denite, are (9) and (10). Hence, if a = 0, that is the buyer is
not constrained, combining the two FOCs and dening a = vba=v
s
a, we obtain that y = y
(a) such
that u0(y(a))=c0(y(a)) = a. This holds if and only if a  a(a)  c(y(a))=vsa.
If the buyer is constrained, that is, a > 0, then we obtain from the constraint that the sellers
surplus should be non-negative that that qa = a and y = c 1(vsaa) < y(a). This holds if and
only if a < a(a).
Proof of Lemma 2
From (2) we have that
W ba(a) = u
0(y)
dy
da
  vba
dqa
da
+ vba.
From lemma 1 we know that if a  a(a) then dy=da = dqa=da = 0, implying that W ba(a) = vba.
When a < a(a), then we have that dqa=da = 1 and from the sellers zero surplus condition
dy=da = vsa=c
0(y). Hence, in this case we have
W ba(a) = u
0(y)
vsa
c0(y)
  vba + vba = vsa
u0(y)
c0(y)
,
which can be rewritten as
W ba(a) = v
b
a

1
a
u0(y)
c0(y)

= vba[1 + `(y; a)].
Dening L(y; a)  maxf0; `(y; a)g and combining the two expressions for W ba(a) for a greater
and smaller than a(a), W ba(a) can be rewritten as (15).
Proof of Proposition 1
We will prove existence of a steady-equilibrium by construction. Uniqueness follows.
(i) When the buyer is not constrained the price of the asset does not carry any liquidity premium,
and since the buyer holds all of the asset its price solves  = 
 
 + d

, which yields
 =

1  d.
This implies that
vba =
d
1   , and v
s
a =
d+ (1  )ds
1   ,
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so that
a = ea  d
d+ (1  )ds .
Hence, y = ey = y(ea) is such that
u0(y)
c0(y)
= ea,
and is unique for limy!0 u0(y)=c0(y) =1, u0(y)=c0(y) is strictly decreasing and limy!1 u0(y)=c0(y) =
0. And since sellers obtain no surplus, i.e., vsaqa = c(ey), we have that
qa = eA  1  

c(ey)
d+ (1  )ds .
This holds if and only if the stock of asset in the economy is large enough, that is, if and only if
A  eA.
(ii) When buyers are constrained, i.e., when A < eA, then buyers give away their entire asset
holding to the seller they are matched with, and therefore y < ey solves c(y) = vsaA. Replacing
vsa by its expression yields
c(y) = 

 + d
s

A. (A1)
Since y < ey, we have that `(y; a) > 0, and therefore the price of the asset is given by
 = vba 
1
a
u0(y)
c0(y)
.
Since a = vba=v
s
a, and that v
s
a =  + d
s
, the above expression simplies to
 
 + d
s = 
u0(y)
c0(y)
. (A2)
(A1) and (A2) form a system of two equations in the two unknowns  and y. (A1) gives
y1( ) such that y1(0) = c 1(dsA) > 0 for A > 0, and y1( ) is strictly increasing in  with
lim !1 y1( ) = 1. (A2) gives y2( ) such that lim !0 y2( ) = 1, y2( ) is strictly decreasing
and converges to some strictly positive value. This implies that there is a unique solution (y;  ) to
the two equations.
Moreover, (A2) is una¤ected by changes in A whereas (A1) shifts up as A increases. This
implies that y and  are strictly increasing and strictly decreasing respectively in A. It is easy to
verify that when A = eA, we obtain y = ey and  = e .
Proof of Lemma 3
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The rst order conditions for problem (24), which are necessary and su¢ cient for the Hessian
for the Lagrangian is negative semi-denite, are (25), (26), and (27). First, when a = vba=v
s
a =
vbm=v
s
m = m, we have that a > 0 if and only if m > 0. We then have two cases:
 Case 1: m = a = 0. Then from (26) and (27) we have that  = m. This, together with
(25) implies that y = y (m) with y (m) such that `(y (m) ; m) = 0. Hence, we have that the
transfer (qa; qm) is such that vsaqa + v
s
mqm = !
 (m) = c(y (m))=. And since m = a = 0, this
holds if and only if ! (a;m) = vsaa+ v
s
mm  ! (m).
 Case 2: m > 0 and a > 0. In this case we have that qa = a, qm = m and since Ss(y) = 0,
we have that
y(a;m) = c 1[(vsmm+ v
s
aa)]:
T holds if and only if ! (a;m) = vsaa+ v
s
mm < !
 (m).
Proof of Lemma 4
The rst thing to note is that if a = vba=v
s
a > v
b
m=v
s
m = m, we have that qa > 0 implies that
m > 0, i.e., if money is transferred from the buyer to the seller it is only because the buyer has
run out of money. We therefore have four cases to consider.
 Case 1: qm > 0; m = 0, and therefore qa = a = 0. From (25) and (27), we have that
y = y (m) with y (m) such that `(y (m) ; m) = 0. Hence, we have that qm = m (m) =
c(y (m))=vsm and since m = 0, this holds if and only if m  m (m).
 Case 2: qm > 0; m > 0, and qa = a = 0. In this case, since qa = 0, we have from (26) and
(27) that  > m. Moreover, m > 0 implies qm = m, and therefore y = c
 1(vsmm). And  2
(m; a) implies that this holds if and only if m 2 (m (a) ;m (m)) where m (a) = c(y (a))=vsm
and y (a) solves `(y (a) ; a) = 0.
 Case 3: qm > 0; m > 0, qa > 0 and a = 0. Then one has y = y (a), qm = m, and from
(26), qa is such that
qa(m; a) =
c(y (a))
vsa
  v
s
m
vsa
m.
This holds if and only if m < m (a) and  (vsmm+ vsaa)  c(y (a)).
 Case 4: qm > 0; m > 0, qa > 0 and a > 0. In this case we have that qa = a, qm = m and
since Ss(y) = 0, we have that
y(a;m) = c 1[(vsmm+ v
s
aa)]:
This holds if and only if m < m (a) and  (vsmm+ vsaa) < c(y (a)).
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Proof of Lemma 5
It is symmetric to that of lemma 4 and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Lemma 6
From lemma 4 we have that
dy
dm
=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 , if m  m (m) ;
vsm
c0(y) , if m 2 [m (a) ;m (m));
0 , if m < m (a) and !(a;m)  ! (a) ;
vsm
c0(y) , if m < m
 (a) and !(a;m) < ! (a) ,
,
dqm
dm
=
8<: 1 , if m < m (m) ;0 , otherwise, , and dqadm =
8<:  
vsm
vsa
, if m < m (a) and !(a;m)  ! (a) ;
0 , otherwise.
Similarly,
dy
da
=
8<:
vsa
c0(y) , if m < m
 (a) and !(a;m) < ! (a) ,
0 , otherwise.
,
dqa
da
=
8<: 1 , if m < m (a) and !(a;m) < ! (a) ,0 , otherwise, , and dqmda = 0.
And since
Ebz @vb;bz
@qa
=  vba, and Ebz @vb;bz@qm =  vbm,
we have that
W ba(a;m) = v
b
a + v
b
a

vsa
vba
u0(y)
c0(y)
  1

 1 fm < m (a) and !(a;m) < ! (a)g ,
and
W bm(a;m) = v
b
m + 

vsm
u0(y)
c0(y)
  vbm

 1 fm < m (a) and !(a;m) < ! (a)g+


 vbm + vba 
vsm
vsa

 1 fm < m (a) and !(a;m)  ! (a)g+


vsm
u0(y)
c0(y)
  vbm

 1 fm 2 [m (a) ;m (m)g .
Since for m < m (a) and !(a;m)  ! (a) we have that y = y (a) solving `(y; a) = 0, the last
expression can be simplied to
W bm(a;m) = v
b
m + v
b
m

vsm
vbm
u0(y)
c0(y)
  1

 1 fm < m (m)g .
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Proof of Proposition 2
The FOCs for buyers are given by (33), and since buyers hold all the money and asset, we have
that in a monetary equilibrium both equations in (33) hold with equality.
(i) In a monetary equilibrium with stock of asset A and with rate of ination  , the output in the
DM is y() such that 1 +  = [1 + L(y(); 1)], which for  > F =    1 can be rewritten as
1 +  = 
u0(y())
c0(y())
. (39)
However, in a non-monetary equilibrium the level of output is given by ey(A) solving (A1) and (A2)
for A < eA and is ey otherwise. Hence, since for a monetary equilibrium to exist agents must be
better o¤ holding money and the asset than using only the asset, in a monetary equilibrium we
must have that y()  minfey(A); eyg. This implies that for A  eA we must have   , where 
solves
1 +  = 
u0(ey)
c0(ey) .
And for A < eA the supremum ination rate is (A) = minfe(A); 0g,15 with e(A) such that
1 + e(A) = u0(ey(A))
c0(ey(A)) = ea.
We leave for later the proof that  must be strictly less than 0. Since u0(y)=c0(y) is strictly decreasing
in y we have that  0(A)  0.
(ii) For  2 F ;  we have from (A3) that u0(y()=c0(y()) 2 [1;ea]. This implies that for  2
F ; 

that La(y();ea) = 0, and, using (33), we therefore obtain that  () = vba =    () + d.
That is,
 () = e .
And we can check that when  () = e , then a = ea. Moreover, then
ea = d
d+ (1  )ds < 1,
which implies that  < 0.
For  2 (; (A)], we have from (A3) that u0(y()=c0(y()) 2 (ea; u0(ey(A))=c0(ey(A))). This
implies that for  2 (; (A)] that
La(y(); a) + 1 =
1
a
[Lm(y(); 1) + 1] > 1.
15The supremum is a maximum when (A) = e(A) < 0.
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We therefore obtain that the price of the asset is given by
 () = vba 
1
a
u0(y())
c0(y())
,
which, using the facts that u0(y()=c0(y()) = 1 +  and a = vba=vsa, yields
 () = vsa (1 + ) =

 () + d
s

(1 + ) , that is
 () =
(1 + ) d
s
  .
It is clear that we must have  < 0 for otherwise the price of the asset is unbounded, which cannot
be true in equilibrium. And therefore for  2 (; (A)] we have that  0() > 0.
Appendix B
If both buyers and sellers have a constant disutility of e¤ort equal to one in the last subperiod
of their lives, then, when the monetary policy is stationary, we have that vsa = v
b
a =  + d and
vsm = v
b
m =
b, and therefore a = m = 1. The rst order conditions for the portfolio decisions for
sellers and buyers are
a :      + d , = if as > 0;
m : 1 +   , = if ms > 0,
and
a :      + d [1 + L(y; 1)] , = if ab > 0;
m : 1 +    [1 + L(y; 1)] , = if mb > 0.
(A4)
For  > F , if money is to be held it will be held by buyers, in which case it follows that from the
buyersFOC wrt money that y < y. However, since buyers and sellers value the asset the same
way, in an equilibrium without money buyers can purchase the quantity y if the stock of asset in
the economy is
A  bA  1  
d
c(y)

.
It follows that if the stock of asset is large enough, i.e., A  bA then (A) = F , in which case
money is not essential. If A < bA, then buyers can purchase less than y(A) < y in the DM, and
therefore then, following the line of proof for proposition2, one can show that (A) > F , and that
for all  2 [F ; (A)) the quantity produced in the DM is strictly greater than y, and therefore
money is essential.
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